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Abstract: Land, as a factor of production, has a vital role within the agricultural sector compared
with other sectors. However, in recent years, land mobility has become a significant issue around
the world with increased concentration and competition for land ownership, limiting the overall
competitiveness of the agri-food sector and constraining the potential opportunities for new entrant
farmers to access land. While land leasing is increasingly being embraced as a common form of land
tenure serving as an alternative to the purchase of land for agriculture, the length of lease has been
shown to have a significant impact on land productivity and sustainability. In this study, we provide
a comprehensive and systematic review exploring the benefits of longer-term land leasing with a
particular focus on developed countries and some selected developing countries in the context of
commercial farming with more formal arrangements. Specifically, we highlight the barriers to long-
term land leasing and identify potential incentives that might be adopted to encourage long-term
land leasing for both landowners and farmers who seek to rent land.
Keywords: land leasing; agricultural policy; land use; tenure security
1. Introduction
Land, as a factor of production, has a vital role within the agricultural sector compared
with other sectors [1,2]. Efficiently operating agricultural land markets are critical in
determining efficient production systems and structures and in their contribution to wider
sustainable development at a societal level [3–6]. Agricultural land markets supported by
policies that guarantee tenure arrangements for farmers have been shown to contribute
to the productive utilisation of land as a resource by facilitating the transfer of land from
less productive producers to more productive producers [7–11]. In recent years, land
mobility has become a significant issue around the world with increased concentration
and competition for land ownership [12], limiting the overall competitiveness of the agri-
food sector and constraining the potential opportunities for new entrant farmers to access
land [13–15].
Generally, land can be accessed either by permanent or temporary transfer [16] and
the distinguishing factor in the transfer of land is the power of control over the bundle of
property rights [17]. Property rights determine the social relationship between actors in
relation to a valuable property object, in this case agricultural land [18,19]. The permanent
transfer of land through purchase, sale or inheritance/gift confers ownership of the land
to the particular physical person/legal entity who then expresses the fullest bundle of
property rights [20]. In this context, when the transfer of land is temporary, mainly through
leasing, this represents a partial bundle of property rights [20].
The transfer of land through sale is usually very limited due to high transaction
costs, credit market imperfections and can also involve complex legal requirements and
family issues. [9,21]. For example, less than 2% of utilisable agricultural area (UAA) is
typically being sold every year in European Union (EU) member states [16,22]. The value
is even lower in the United States of America, where it is estimated that only about 0.5%
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of farmland is sold annually [23]. Hence, permanent transfer of land is achieved through
inheritance/gift. However, this usually results in the ownership of land being concentrated
in the hands of very few people excluding those who may have an interest in farming but
do not have access to such opportunities [16].
Land leasing, as an alternative to the purchase of agricultural land, is increasingly
being embraced as a mechanism for securing tenure of land. A major contributing factor
to this trend is the high purchase price of agricultural land due to an overall lack of land
coming on to the market for sale each year [1,5,9,24].
In this study, we provide a comprehensive and systematic review of the justification
for long-term land leasing. We also highlight the challenges to long-term land leasing and
identify potential incentives that might be adopted to encourage long-term land leasing for
both landowners and farmers who seek to rent land. An understanding of the benefits that
long-term land leasing provides has the potential to improve the efficiency of the agri-food
supply chain and enhance sustainable agricultural production. This study will provide
an evidence base to inform the development of policies targeted at incentivising farmers
and landowners to adopt long-term land leasing, thereby delivering a more efficient land
market alongside providing greater financial security to landowners. In addition, the
results of this study will be useful in the design of policies to support future land leasing
schemes which can provide improved equilibrium between land owned and land leased
over a longer period of time. It also has the potential to facilitate structural change, as
improved stability in the land market in the long term can allow for better strategic decision
making at farm level.
It is important to emphasize that the focus of this paper is mainly to provide justifica-
tion for long-term land leasing by reviewing its benefits and challenges across different
countries with a particular focus on developed countries and some selected developing
countries in the context of commercial farming with more formal arrangements. It does not
attempt to provide detailed analysis of land use and associated policies or traditions/norms
around land tenure in distinct countries. This is because land markets and land use policies
are quite diverse across different countries and can even vary within a single country [25].
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we explain the concept of
land leasing and the theoretical background. A detailed description of our search strategy
is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we highlight the need for long-term land leasing,
while in Section 5 we identify the challenges to the adoption of long-term land leasing.
We point out the ways to facilitate the adoption of long-term land leasing in Section 6
and conclude in Section 7 by presenting an overview of the study outcomes alongside
highlighting some suggested areas for future research.
2. The Concept of Land Leasing and Theoretical Background
A lease by definition is the transfer of possession and use of a physical asset for a
time less than its expected useful life in return for economic consideration [26]. From
an economic perspective, the terms lease and rent have many similar features, including
having a duration less than the useful life of the asset and transferring the residual rights
associated with the asset to the renter. However, technically they are quite different; rental
refers to the short-term rights to use assets and is not regarded as transferring possession
of the asset to the renter, but instead conveys only a temporary license [26]. Leasing
is an instrument of investment finance through which the legal ownership of the good
is dissociated from its economic ownership [27]. Lease performs an essential economic
function of allowing a person or legal entity to acquire an asset at lower cost than what
they would have to pay to own the asset [26].
A rural lease according to de Almeida and Buainain [28] is “an agrarian contract by
which a person (lessor) is bound to allow another (lessee), for a fixed or undetermined
period of time, the use of land or rural property, part or parts thereof, including or excluding
other goods, improvements made and/or facilities, in order to exercise farming, cattle
raising, agro-industrial, extractive or a combination of activities, via compensation or rent,
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subject to the percentage limits permitted by the law”. The lessor takes back possession of
the land or rural property after the lease expires while the lessee is entitled to use the land
or rural property free of interference from the lessor during the lease provided the lessee
pays the rent and performs the other obligations of the lease [26].
Specifically, in the case of land, the lease agreement, which may be written or oral,
transfers parts of the bundle of property rights from the landowner to the tenant in exchange
for either a fixed rental payment every period (a fixed rent contract) or a predetermined
share of the output (share-cropping contract) [2,5,17,22,29]. Land leasing contracts are regu-
lated by a lease agreement which sets out the obligations of the parties involved during the
period of the lease and so provides useful legal protection to everyone concerned [1,18,19].
The legally required elements are usually minimal which allows the parties greater flexi-
bility in structuring the other aspects of their relationship using specific lease provisions
tailored to their individual needs and circumstances [26]. The leasing is undertaken under a
different set of conditions and level of protection for the lessee with different combinations
of three groups of rights—user rights, occupancy rights, and owner rights [20,30].
Land leasing is an important tool for economic development and its growing use can
be explained by its effects on generating liquidity, releasing equity capital and improving
accounting ratios [26,27]. From a rural development point of view, land leasing performs
social functions by enabling people who do not own land or possess only limited capital
and income to access it, thereby providing conditions for entrepreneurship in the field of
agriculture [5]. For the lessee, the leasing of land serves as a medium to obtain income from
farming without having to commit a lot of money to the purchase of land. Whereas, for the
lessor, land lease serves as a great opportunity to obtain incomes without cultivating the
land [31].
Land leasing also functions to minimise the risk of owning land, by transferring
the residual rights from the owner to the lessee for the duration of the lease, allowing
the lessee to try out the use of the land without having to purchase the land with debt
financing [9,26,30,32]. With this, both the lessor and the lessee bear less risk than if they
held the land alone. Reducing risk is a benefit, for which the party who achieves the greatest
reduction in risk will have to compensate the other. Leases provide a ready mechanism to
do this through adjustments in rent [26].
Leasing land also comes with greater managerial flexibility, while meeting environ-
mental restrictions, off-farm work obligations and can accommodate different forms of
contracts. The flexibility allows it to serve as an important means of developing the re-
quired economies of scale for modern agriculture [33]. For example, a study by [9] among
dairy farmers in Ireland showed that those farmers who rent land have higher outputs
and are more profitable compared to those farmers who do not rent land. Serra et al. [34]
also showed that farmers with a higher proportion of rented land are more productive,
are more prone to invest in machinery and use more variable inputs than farmers who
only farmed their owned land. Similarly, [30] also found that farms in Sweden with more
leased land produced food more intensively compared to farms with a greater portion of
owned land. In these studies, it is argued that the direct costs incurred in the form of land
rentals creates stronger incentives for the farmers who rent land to work on the land more
intensively, relative to the opportunity costs borne by owned fields. Similar conclusions
were also reached by [35].
The choice of contract duration is an important component of contract design in
agricultural land leases. According to [36], long-term land leases are chosen when the costs
of transferring tenant assets attached to the land are high, or if the depreciation of assets
beyond the contract period are difficult to assess and therefore difficult to price for transfer
to the landowner. On the other hand, short-term contracts reduce the costs of enforcing
contract stipulations and the costs of renegotiation or tenant dismissal in the face of market
uncertainties, poor tenant performance, or disputes over poorly defined rights to assets.
When the tenant’s land-specific assets are exhausted within the contract period or if the
landowner provides the land-specific permanent assets, then short-term contracts become
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more viable [36,37]. However, it is often not the case that land-specific assets are exhausted
within the contract period in modern agricultural production systems, particularly in
developed countries where agricultural production requires the use of cutting-edge capital
equipment and land management techniques to ensure increased productivity and the
sustainable management of land. Fixed inputs used in agricultural production are provided
directly by either the landowner or tenant and are often not readily shared. The extent to
which the tenant or landowner becomes the residual claimant of the input productivity
depends on the length of the lease term [37], in particular, if the productive life of the
inputs extends beyond the contract period and if the post-contract transfer of asset rights is
difficult [37].
The incentives of tenants to provide durable site-specific inputs are weakest for
short-term contracts and stronger for longer contracts because the variable for investment
incentives is the expectation of being able to appropriate future returns [37,38]. For instance,
maintaining soil fertility to increase production requires investment in land management
in the form of applying appropriate levels of fertilizer, but the effect of such an investment
goes beyond the period in which the investment is undertaken. Tenants will choose
the optimal level of investment if they anticipate that they will benefit from increased
productivity in the future. Incentives to invest in land improvement can be provided by
establishing contracts that are long enough to allow tenants to benefit from future potential
productivity gains [38].
3. Materials and Methods
This study systematically collates and appraises key policy documents and academic
papers to identify the barriers to long-term land leasing and explore the mechanisms to
support and encourage long-term land leasing. The search strategy follows that employed
by [39–41]. The review was undertaken in five stages: (1) formulation of the research
question, (2) design of the search protocol, (3) literature search, (4) screening of collected
literature and (5) analysis and interpretation of the literature.
We develop a search query using a set of keywords to formulate the following:
• Land leasing;
• Land tenure security;
• Land leasing policies;
• Incentives for land leasing;
• Justification for long-term land leasing;
• Encouraging long-term land leasing;
• Barriers to long-term land leasing;
• Land leasing and agricultural productivity;
• Challenges to long-term land leasing.
A comprehensive and extensive search of the scholarly research articles was carried
out using three databases—Scopus, Web of Science and Google scholar. In addition, we
also utilised available resources in the World Wide Web and Google and also manually
searched for papers that were cited in key publications and journals reviewed. All the
papers retrieved from the searches were first uploaded to EndNote software [42] to manage
references and remove duplicates. Two levels of screening (title-abstract-keyword and
then full text screening) were conducted. There was no search restriction imposed on
geographic location or date of publication outside those built into the databases themselves.
We transferred all the papers retrieved from the EndNote library to the Nvivo software
for qualitative analysis [43]. A thematic and open coding (categorisation of text based on
known and emergent themes) of the texts to identify relevant issues and linkages in the
literature was then conducted in Nvivo [44]. The use of the Nvivo 12 software facilitated
a critical review, analysis and synthesis of the literature by simplifying the process of
drawing the possible relationships/linkages among different themes (codes).
We explored 2477 studies retrieved from the databases and eventually considered
83 papers, which included 72 journal articles, 1 thesis, 1 book, 1 conference paper and
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8 reports for the qualitative analysis. Papers are excluded if they do not contain any
information relating to land leasing after reading the abstracts in the first screening process.
For the second screening, which involved full text review, papers were excluded if they did
not provide any information relating to land leasing in the form of definition, challenges,
justification, types or policies. The flow chart for the quantitative search and screening is
presented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Flow chart for quantitative search and screening.
The distribution of r v ewe studies included in the nalysis, by year of publication,
is pres nted in Figure 2, and the list of reviewed papers is rovi ed in Appendix A. The
majority of the reviewed papers r late to land l asing in developed economies. Where
developing countries are menti ned, this is mostly in the context of commercial farming
under more formal arrangements. This may be linked to the fact that long-term land
leasing is a function of the level of development of land markets, which are more advanced
in modern (developed) economies compared to more agrarian-based economies where
customary or other community-based land tenure systems dominate (and where indeed
land leasing is a much more complicated and contested issue). This is evidenced in the
study by [45] in which they found that more technologically advanced societies have a
more functional land market compared to those of less developed countries.
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Figure 2. Distribution of reviewed studies included in analysis, by year of publication (total n = 83).
4. The Case for Long-Term Land Leasing
The duration of land rental contracts has a significant impact on the abilities of farmers
to respond to changes in the external environment, including economic and production
conditions. This is because farmers are often required to make long-term strategic decisions
around land and other resource use, type of enterprise and capital investment towards
farm expansion [30]. Short-term letting agreements are considered a barrier to these
objectives [46]. Generally, countries with well-developed agricultural systems and strict
rental market regulations, such as France and Belgium, tend to have a higher rate f
ric lt r l l r l s [ , , , ]. l i s s r f t r rti f
tili l i lt l ( ) l i l t tri .
l . t i ti f f l t t r i s e selecte co ntries.
Countries Average UAA/Farm(ha)
Owned UAA, % of
Total UAA




France 58.7 38.3 61.7 1.5
Germany 58.6 38.7 61.4 2.6
United Kingdom 81.41 69.4 30.6 -
Netherlands 27.4 58.8 41.2 34.2
Belgium 34.6 32.9 67.1 1.6
Italy 12.0 64.9 35.1 16.0
Spain 24.1 61.0 39.0 18.5
USA 216 60.0 38.0 34.8
Northern Ireland 1 41.2 72.2 27.8 2 -
Sources: Léger-Bosch, Houdart, Loudiyi and Le Bel [47]; 1 DAERA [48]; 2 Land is taken under the conacre system of short-term lettings.
Land leasing can either be short-term, usually less than five years, or long term when
the contract spans over five years and the farmer has the ability to access or use the land
over a longer time frame. Long-term land leasing has been identified as important for the
efficiency of the farmland lease market, with numerous advantages both to the lessee and
the lessor compared to short-term land leasing [49]. While a lot of work is being done
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to encourage long-term land leasing, short-term land leasing is still very popular. The
conacre system which is a short-term land rental system unique to Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland is a good example of such [50]. The system (nominally for 11 months or
364 days) permits land to be let to other farmers without the need for either party to enter a
long-term commitment. Currently around one third (about 300,000 hectares) of agricultural
land in Northern Ireland is being farmed under the conacre agreements. While short-term
land leasing contracts might be flexible in relation to contract renewal and adjustment to
external changes, such contracts lack long-term security to allow farmers to invest in land
development and long-term planning [22,51]. In the following subsections, we explain the
justification of long-term land leasing on a point-by-point basis.
4.1. Farm Productivity and Profitability
Farmland tenure security has a significant impact on the utilisation of land. Indeed,
land tenure and secure rights in particular have an impact on a farm’s profitability by
reducing transaction costs relating to land rental renegotiation and through their effect
on investment and access to credit. Moreover, by facilitating the reallocation of factors of
production, effective land tenure mechanisms maximise allocative efficiency in resource use,
allowing for economic diversification and growth [2,52]. For example, a study by Kumari
and Nakano [53] in Fiji compared tenure security between three tenure types and found
out that that lease tenure insecurity had a significant negative impact on farm productivity
and investment. They found from their study that cane farmers with short-term leases
(0–5 years) achieve lower productivity levels, 6.5–11 tonnes per hectare, and made less
investment in newly planted cane, 0.14–0.25 hectares, compared to farmers on long-term
lease and freehold. In a study by Geoghegan and O’Donoghue [16] in Republic of Ireland,
they estimated that tillage farmers could potentially earn higher income from leasing out
land on a long-term basis, earning 37% less from farming as opposed to leasing out their
land and entitlements. They highlighted that if cattle finishers opted not to actively farm
and leased out their land and entitlements over a seven-year term, they would earn 44%
more from leasing out compared to what they earned if actively farming. Marks-Bielska [1]
found that the efficiency of leased land in Poland is comparable to the efficiency of owned
land when stable long-term agreements are in place while Akram, Akram, Hongshu,
Andleeb, Kashif and Mehmood [10] also found that crop yield in owner-cultivated and
long-term contracts is significantly higher compared to yield in share contracts lands.
4.2. Farm Investment
The level of security, often linked to the temporality of lease, affects farmers’ long-term
perspective of planning production and investment in land [30,54,55]. With long-term
land leasing, farmers are able to enter a long-term contract without losing the incentive
to make long-term investment [11,56,57]. Generally, investment is usually associated
with certainty. Long-term land leasing gives more certainty to the farm business and
the scale of farming operations. It offers greater security in land and provides farmers
with greater confidence and incentives to invest in land improvement initiatives such as
roadways, fencing, reseeding, reclamation, water management and investing in precision
agriculture equipment which might improve the long-term fertility and productivity of
the land [58]. With secure leasing arrangements, farmers are emboldened to invest in soil
and productivity improvements due to them being guaranteed that they can hold the land
for a longer time to gain investment returns [10]. For example, Deininger and Jin [59]
used a large data set from Ethiopia that differentiates tenure security and transferability to
explore determinants of different types of land-related investment and its possible impact
on productivity. They found that stronger transfer rights have a positive effect on terracing
investment in which it is found to have a significant impact on productivity.
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4.3. Farm Level Sustainability and Land Management
Lease terms—including lease length and type—have been identified as a barrier to the
adoption of sustainable land management practices and the uptake of agri-environmental
schemes [20,58,60]. Sustainable techniques of production, including conservation practices
and organic methods, require long-term investments in management and sometimes
equipment [61]. Long-term improvements such as drainage tiles, grassed waterways,
contour farming and forage rotation crops are not feasible under the short-term leases
and this is often an important consideration in farmers’ decision to adopt conservation
practices [62,63]. Ayamga et al. [64] analysed household farm investment decisions under
varying land tenure arrangements in Ghana. They found from their analysis that duration
of tenure security positively influenced households’ decision to invest in soil improvement
and conservation measures. This is linked to the fact that conservation practices are often
considered as capital improvements with immediate costs but in which benefits accrue
over the long-term. Greater security on the land through long-term leasing gives farmers
more confidence to invest in soil and fertility management. This is evidenced in the study
by [16] in which they found that land rented over a short rental period (conacre system) in
Republic of Ireland often tends to be of poorer quality compared to farms under long-term
lease or owner occupied. Also, a study by [65] in which they examined the impacts of
participation in off-farm work and land tenancy contracts on the intensity of investment in
soil-improving measures and farm productivity in the Punjab province of Pakistan showed
that tenure security increases the intensity of investment in long-term soil-improving
measures and exerts significant and positive effects on farm productivity. Similarly, a study
by [10] has shown that secured land tenure has a positive impact on soil conservation
adoption in India. A study by [66] in China on the effect of land transfer quality on
the application of organic fertiliser by large-scale farmers showed that the stability of
transferred land management rights measured in terms of the “land lease term” has a
significant effect on the application of organic fertiliser to land. Specifically, they found
that an increase in lease term by one year increased the probability of organic fertiliser
application by 2.3% and the intensity of application by 1.45 %. They also found that a break
in the land transfer contract during the lease term decreased the probability of applying
organic fertiliser by 12.89 %, and the intensity of application by 9.31 %. A study by [38]
has also shown that the duration of land leasing contracts is strongly correlated with tree
cultivation. In their analysis, they found that increasing the duration of a land leasing
contract from one year to more than three years increased the probability of cultivating
trees by 80 per cent. This supports the notion that when farmers are not certain of recouping
their investment in land improvement they are more likely to adopt management strategies
that maximise short-term benefits even if this gradually diminishes the sustainability of
soil fertility, thus contributing to negative externalities and possibly leading to market
failure [10,60,67].
4.4. Facilitate Structural Change and Encourage New Entrants to Farming
A key driver for improving productivity performance in agriculture is having people
with the skills and entrepreneurial drive to implement new ideas in the sector. Access
to land in the long term is becoming more difficult for younger and/or new entrant
farmers wanting to set up a farming business. This adds to an increasingly aging farming
population and limits opportunities for younger farmers and new entrants to get into
the industry, who can bring new skills, ideas and innovation into the sector. Long-term
land leasing has the potential to facilitate structural change and encourage a younger
generation of farmers, with the requisite skills and knowledge, to take up farming and
adopt modern technologies and best farming practices to stay competitive [9]. Longer-term
tenancy agreements could provide a more secure opportunity for younger and/or new
entrants to the farming business to gain knowledge and experience without the fear of
losing their investment in the land which can happen in the case of short-term land leasing
contracts [68,69]. Given the relatively high cost of purchasing land, long-term land leasing
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also serves as a viable alternative by allowing young farmers and new entrants to gain
access to land by providing a cheaper means of long-term access to land.
4.5. Access to Credit
Access to credit is a significant part of the agricultural production system. In some
countries, depending on the regulation, long-term land leasing has the potential to facil-
itate the use of land as collateral to access credit markets [1,8,70]. This is because most
financial institutions provide credit only when they are confident that there is enough time
for repayment and this is not normally possible with short-term land leasing [71]. In a
study by [10] in which they investigated the impact of three land tenure arrangements on
organic farming (OF) in Punjab, India, they provide empirical support for the assumption
that farmers with secured land rights including long-term leasing are more productive
compared to those with insecure lease agreements because they have greater access to
credits by using land as a collateral. Research by [22] in Saxony, Germany, has also linked
long-term land contracts to investment credits by maintaining that farmers with long land
rental contracts have greater access to credits.
4.6. Easy Retirement Decision
Finding a suitable successor is increasingly becoming a big challenge for farmers who
are planning to retire due to a number of social and economic reasons. For example, 40 per
cent of farmers over the age of 60 in the UK have no prospective successor [22]. Similarly,
about half of farmers in Republic of Ireland have no identified successor and two thirds of
those indicated that they did not intend to fully retire from active farming in the future
due to their strong social and moral connections to the land and local community [22,46].
Research has shown that where no successor can be designated, or the successor is not ready
to take over the farm, farmers tend to continue to gradually wind down their business
rather than selling up or leasing the land out to younger farmers outside the family a
phenomenon termed the ‘retirement effect’ [22]. Long-term land leasing offers landowners,
who may want to retire from farming, the opportunity to earn stable and long-term income
from their land while ensuring the maintenance of the land, machinery and associated
farm buildings without any fear of disruption in their income stream [22,72]. Long-term
land leasing also ensures ownership of the land is retained should a successor require it
in the future. Thus, the landowner also benefits from the opportunity to contribute to the
development of the society by making land available to be farmed by a new tenant and at
the same time significantly reducing the cost of capital investments that would have be
borne by the new entrant [15].
5. Challenges to Long-Term Land Leasing
5.1. The Desire to Keep Land in the Family Name
An important challenge to the development of long-term land leasing is the desire of
landowners to keep land in the family name [22]. Historically, family farm businesses not
only serve an economic function but also have social and cultural functions from which
individuals derive a sense of commitment and belonging to family history and the non-
financial (lifestyle) benefits that they derive from farming and owning land [22]. Generally,
farmers identify themselves strongly with their farmland and its sense of place, across
both space and time, which can make it difficult for them to consider disengaging from
active farming and engaging in longer-term land leasing [46]. There is always the desire to
continue the family tradition in farming, with a sense of duty to be custodians of the land
and a desire to keep the farm operational for future generations [46,72]. Farming on owned
land rather than leasing the land has been described as providing the farmer with identity,
occupation, control, and status in the community as well as social and cultural capital.
As a consequence farming households can find it difficult to make their land available
for long-term leasing as it might be associated with a loss of these intrinsic values [46].
“Indeed, studies of farmland market transactions reveal that sales of farmland often only
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come about through death or retirement rather than a result of affordability levels” [23].
This has been identified as one of the main reasons for the continued use of short-term
land leasing (conacre) in the Republic of Ireland, particularly within small local rural
communities despite generous tax incentives to encourage the adoption of long-term land
leasing [16]. Landowners find it difficult to disengage from the farm and will as a result
prefer to let out their land on a short term basis. Moreover, they may have concerns that a
long-term tenant might establish some legal claim to the occupancy of their land [51]. The
study by [46] specifically found that the attachment to the land, the high value that is put
on the family tradition of farm ownership and the attachment to the farm work itself have
an influence on the transfer of land either through sale, long-term leasing or partnership.
5.2. The Fear of Sudden Change in Policy
Policies play a key role in the development of the farmland lease market. Uncertainty
around future changes in policy is an important factor that constrains the adoption of
long-term land leasing, especially in the EU, normally as a result of the link between the
use of the land and the EU subsidy payments [9]. In situations when subsidies accrue to
the active farmer who uses the land rather than the landowner, farmland owners, as much
as they can, want to maintain control over the land to ensure flexibility. Therefore, they will
be reluctant to lease out the land on a long-term basis as a subsidy policy change within the
term of the lease may deprive them of future subsidy payments. This was the case in 2013,
following the re-negotiation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), in which farmers
who had leased out all their land were not considered to be ‘active’ farmers and were
therefore not eligible for new entitlements under the new subsidy system [16]. “Although
rental income may surpass farm income (including subsides), the guaranteed nature of
subsidy payments (subject to meeting minimum guidelines) means that farmers may be
cautious in making decisions that could put their future subsidy income at risk” [16].
Sudden change in policy has also been identified as a reason for the unwillingness of
landlords to commit to long-term land leasing in Nicaragua. According to [38], in the
1981 land reform in Nicaragua following the Sandinista revolution, large landholdings
not managed by their owners were expropriated and redistributed to former tenants and
landless peasants. As a result of this experience, landlords were concerned that this type
of reform would be repeated and hence preferred not to make long-term commitments to
avoid situations where tenants might be difficult to evict.
5.3. Transaction Costs and Bureaucracy
The process of leasing land for the long term often involves strict legal contract
enforcement which might be costly and involve lengthy bureaucratic procedures in some
countries. The process might include incurring administrative costs, costs associated with
the use of authorised experts and in some countries, such as Germany, both parties need to
have a legal adviser, which is also costly [22]. In such an environment, the use of seasonal
and informal contracts for a short term may be considered preferable both to the potential
lessor and the lessee.
5.4. Lack of Awareness of Government Policies
Lack of awareness of government policies such as tax and subsidy incentives aimed at
encouraging long-term land leasing is another factor inhibiting the adoption of long-term
land leasing by farmers. This may be as a result of inadequate knowledge or understanding
of the policies by either potential renting in or renting out farmers [9]. Most of the time,
farmers do not have access to adequate information that they need to make decisions
regarding the use and management of their land [73]. This can create uncertainty and a
reluctance on the part of those farmers who have land to let out, engaging in anything
beyond short-term leasing. For example, a study by [74] in Republic of Ireland identified a
lack of awareness around government policies in relation to tax incentives as one of the
reasons for the continued adoption of the short-term land leasing system (conacre) despite
Land 2021, 10, 238 11 of 21
generous tax incentives being available. This points to the need for effective extension pro-
grammes to provide an avenue for better communication of relevant government policies
in order to bring about improved diffusion and adoption of long-term land leasing [73,75].
6. How to Encourage Long-Term Land Leasing
6.1. Legislation
The development of effective land rental policies and legislation is sometimes required
to guide the land market and support long-term land leasing [22,76]. For example, in Slo-
vakia, farmers are required to rent land for at least five years to be able to access European
CAP funds, thus providing an incentive for farmers to sign contracts with a longer duration
of up to ten years [70]. In Belgium, policies enacted to protect tenant farmers and promote
long-term land leasing include: pre-emption rights, automatic renewal of the lease for
the tenant farmer, a minimum term of agreement of 9 years which can extend up to 18
years or more with an option of a “career agreement” with a term equal to the expected
career of the farmer and construction rights. In addition, when they retire, tenants are
allowed to transfer their rental agreements to family members who wish to take it up for
farming [76]. Similar policies are in operation in France where the minimum length of a
lease is also nine years and the availability of long-term leases of 18 and 25 years, as well
as career-long leases (the duration is set for the retirement age of the tenant) [22,76]. In
Scotland, there are different forms of agricultural leases permitted under the 2003 Act to
support long-term land leasing. There are the short limited duration tenancies (SLDTs)
which allow agricultural land to be leased for up to 5 years. From the 30 November 2017,
this was automatically converted to the Modern Limited Duration Tenancy (MLDT) which
has a minimum term of 10 years if the lease agreement was created after 22 March 2011 or
Limited Duration Tenancy (LDT) with a minimum term of 15 years, if created before. There
is also the Repairing Tenancy Act which sets out to provide a means for a tenant to take on a
potentially run-down farm and bear the cost of improvements. The tenancy has a minimum
term of 35 years, including an initial ‘repairing period’ of at least 5 years [22,68]. In Sweden,
there are two distinct forms of leasehold, whole-farm lease and side lease. The whole-farm
lease, which includes buildings and stable houses, is for five years, and the lease contract is
inheritable between generations. The costs associated with land investments and buildings
are paid by or shared with the landowner [30].
It is important to emphasize that in the formulation of policies to encourage long-term
land leasing, it is essential that such laws do not in any way inhibit tenants’ and landlords’
ability to adapt to change, access new schemes, improve productivity and enable structural
change. There is also the need for some level of flexibility in the formulation of policies
relating to long-term land leasing, for example, by including a break clause at subsequent
intervals for the parties involved in the land contract to review performance in relation
to compliance with the terms of the lease. This will guard against the development of
the so-called ‘grey’ rental sector, in which farmers go into rental contracts (or informal
agreements with peers) outside the official land rental sector. Table 2 gives a summary of
countries that have land leases governed by statute and some of the associated policies.
Table 2. Policies to support long-term land leasing in selected countries.





Belgium 9 Yes Yes Yes
France 9 Yes Yes Yes
Netherlands 12 years for farms and homesteads; 6 yearsfor separate land or buildings Yes Yes Yes
Scotland
new tenancies under the 2003 Act, LDT has a
min. term of either 10 years (if created after
22 March 2011) or 15 years, if created before
Yes No, after 2003 Yes, under the 2003 Act
Sweden whole-farm lease for 5 years Yes Yes
Source: [22,30,77]; LDT: limited duration tenancy; SLDT: short limited duration tenancy.
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6.2. Tax Incentives and Subsidies
Tax incentives and subsidies aimed at stimulating the leasing of farmland have been
identified as an efficient mechanism to make land leasing more attractive to landowners
who do not wish to farm the land themselves. A study by [78] has shown that farm
subsidies have a positive and significant effect on both farmland leasing-in and leasing-out
choices. The study indicated that rural households receiving grain subsidies are more
likely to lease out (1.5 per cent) and lease in farmland (3.2 per cent). For example, in France,
landowners are given incentives for long-term contracts with a 15% reduction in tax on
their revenues from rental contracts longer than 9 years and are entitled to per hectare aid
of up to EUR 8000 from the government [22]. Similarly, in the Republic of Ireland, the
lessor is exempt from income tax on progressively increasing amounts linked to the length
of the lease. Leases of five years or longer are exempt for tax purposes up to a lease period
of 15 or more years with an exemption for the first EUR 40,000 per annum [16]. According
to [9], land leasing tax incentives have resulted in improved resource allocation and farm
profitability in the Republic of Ireland.
7. Conclusions
In this study, we have reviewed the literature on land leasing and have highlighted
the justification for long-term land leasing. We also focused on the challenges to long-term
land leasing and identified ways in which long-term land leasing can be encouraged. The
majority of the reviewed papers relate to land leasing in developed economies. Where
developing countries are mentioned, this is mostly in the context of commercial farming
under more formal arrangements. The results of the study indicate that long-term land
leasing has a lot of advantages, including sustainable land management and productivity.
Farmers are more likely to effectively manage land and increase productivity without
damaging the environment when their tenancy contract is longer. The review also showed
that the attachment to the land and the drive to keep land in the family name is an important
barrier to long-term land leasing. Other barriers to long-term leasing identified in the study
include: the fear of sudden change in policy, lack of awareness on government policies,
transaction costs and bureaucracy. We conclude that countries should adopt policies which
promote long-term land leasing given its advantages. It should be emphasized that synergy
among different factors and the level of implementation of other institutional regulations
are required to be able to fully take advantage of long-term land leasing, for example, access
to credit for farmers and well-developed agricultural extension systems and programmes.
There is also a need to increase awareness of the advantages and benefits of long-term land
leasing, through engagement with all stakeholders, farming organisations and professionals
within the farming sector. In formulating policies on long-term land leasing, there may
be the need for yearly reassessment of rents and having the option of removing a bad
tenant. Governments can also assist the process by developing standard principles to guide
long-term leasing contracts to assist potential lessors and lessees in achieving an equitable
arrangement acceptable to both parties, for example, the appropriate level of rent and
principles guiding the use of the land to ensure it is well maintained.
In the interpretation of the study results, it is essential to note that the studies reviewed
relate mostly to developed economies. Future research should examine those factors which
limit the function of land markets in developing countries. There is also the need for further
research on the relationship between long-term land leasing and farm productivity. While
it is suggested in this study that long-term land leasing has the potential of improving
agricultural productivity, several other human capital, economic, and social factors also
influence the production efficiency of farming businesses. It can also be the case that
farmers who are more productive, perhaps due to a number of factors, such as capital
availability, entrepreneurial spirit and production efficiencies, are the ones that have the
financial resources available to rent more land and may therefore already be better placed
in terms of raising productivity.
Land 2021, 10, 238 13 of 21
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, A.H.A., C.J. and R.M.; methodology, A.H.A. writing—
original draft preparation, A.H.A., C.J. writing—review and editing, A.H.A., C.J. and R.M.; visualiza-
tion, A.H.A. and R.M. project administration, A.H.A. and C.J.; funding acquisition, A.H.A. and C.J.
All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research was funded by Department of Agriculture Environment and Rural Af-
fairs (DAERA), Northern Ireland as part of the Evidence and Innovation Programme (DAERA
E&I, 19/1/05).
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is
not applicable to this article.
Acknowledgments: We acknowledge the support of the Agri-Food and Biosciences Institute (QUB-
AFBI) library in sourcing the papers used for this study.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest and the funders had no role in
the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the
manuscript, or in the decision to publish the results.
Appendix A
Table A1. Themes and papers associated with each theme in Nvivo.
S/N Reference Focus of the Study/Title Country/Sub-Region/Region
1 [79] Understanding the economics of land accessin Ireland Republic of Ireland
2 [9] The factors influencing the profitability ofleased land on dairy farms in Ireland Republic of Ireland
3 [68] Increasing the Availability of Farmland forNew Entrants to Agriculture in Scotland Scotland
4 [80]
Farmland Owners’ Land Sale Preferences:




Rental Market Regulations for Agricultural




Landowner response to policies regulating
land improvements in Finland: Lease or
search for other options?
Finland
7 [15] Agri-Taxation Republic of Ireland
8 [30]
Keeping agriculture alive next to the
city—The functions of the land tenure
regime nearby Gothenburg, Sweden
Sweden
9 [82]
Do Chinese farmers benefit from farmland
leasing choices? Evidence from a
nationwide survey
China
10 [5] Economic and legal differences in patternsof land use in Ukraine Ukraine
11 [2]
Farmland tenure and transaction costs:
Public and collectively owned land vs
conventional coordination mechanisms in
France
France
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12 [47]
Changes in property-use relationships on
French farmland: A social innovation
perspective
France
13 [83] EU land markets and the CommonAgricultural Policy EU countries
14 [51] Land Leasing: Findings of a Study in theWest Region of the Republic of Ireland Republic of Ireland
15 [20]
Do farmers care about rented land? A




Land improvements under land tenure




Understanding barriers and opportunities
for adoption of conservation practices on
rented farmland in the US
US
18 [16] Socioeconomic drivers of land mobility inIrish agriculture Republic of Ireland
19 [84] Farm landowners’ objectives in Finland:Two approaches for owner classifications Finland
20 [17] Land lease contracts: properties and thevalue of bundles of property rights Netherlands
21 [85] Land access for direct market food farmers US
22 [69] Public policy to support young farmers Thailand
23 [86] Political reforms, rural crises, and landtenure i Western Europe
24 [87] Long-term Land Leasing Republic of Ireland
25 [72]
Retired Farmers and New Land Users: How
Relations to Land and People Influence
Farmers’ Land Transfer Decisions
Sweden
26 [88] An Economic Evaluation of the AgriculturalTenancies Act 1995 England
27 [10]
Impact of Land Use Rights on the




Effects of dual land ownerships and
different land lease terms on industrial land
use efficiency
China
29 [89] Exploring long-term land improvementsunder land tenure insecurity Finland
30 [90] Situational analysis of agricultural landleasing in Uttar Pradesh Northern India
31 [91] Does Land Tenure Systems AffectSustainable Agricultural Development? Pakistan
32 [92] Leasing of agricultural land versus agencytheory: the case of Poland Poland
33 [93] land lease tenure insecurity, productivityand investment Fiji
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34 [33]
Drivers of change in Norwegian
agricultural land control and the emergence
of rental farming
Norway
35 [37] Contract duration and the division of laborin agricultural land leases General study
36 [71] Characteristics of land market in Hungaryat the time of the EU accession Hungary
37 [62]
Land tenure and agricultural management:




38 [63] Land tenure and the adoption ofconservation practices US
39 [94]
Do farmers manage weeds on owned and
rented land differently? Evidence from US
corn and soybean farms
US
40 [95] Institutional drivers of land mobility: Republic of Ireland
41 [28]
Land leasing and sharecropping in Brazil:




Land tenure type as an underrated legal
constraint on the conservation management
of coastal dunes
Republic of Ireland
43 [97] Land leasing in rural Ireland Republic of Ireland
44 [98] Investment behavior of the Polish farms Poland
45 [78] Why the uncertain term occurs in thefarmland lease market China
46 [99] Encouraging agricultural land lettings inScotland for the 21st century Scotland
47 [100]
A consultation on tenancy reform and call
for evidence on farm business repossessions
and mortgage restrictions over let land
Wales
48 [7]
Dynamics and resource use efficiency of
agricultural land sales and rental market in
India
India
49 [32] Arkansas landlord selection of land-leasingcontract type and terms US
50 [101] The role of land tenancy in rice farmingefficiency Indonesia
51 [102] New entrants and succession into farming Northern Ireland
52 [103] Aging population, farm succession, andfarmland usage China
53 [104] The moratorium on agricultural land sale asa limiting factor for rural development International study
54 [105] Effects of land tenure and property rightson agricultural productivity Ethiopia
55 [106] Taxing and untaxing land: Current useassessment of farmland US
56 [107] Land tenure, fixed investment, and farmproductivity Zambia
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57 [29] On the choice of tenancy contracts in ruralIndia
58 [108] How cropland contract type and termdecisions are made US
59 [24] Differentiation of rent foragricultural-purpose land International study
60 [109]




61 [110] Promotion incentives, infrastructureconstruction, and industrial landscapes China
62 [111] Passive farming and land development: Areal options approach EU
63 [112] Female successors in Irish family farming:four pathways to farm transfer Republic of Ireland
64 [113]
Adaptation to climate change via
adjustment in land leasing: Evidence from
dryland wheat farms in the US Pacific
Northwest
US
65 [114] The value of social capital in farmlandleasing relationships US
66 [115] Impact of land reform on sustainable landmanagement in Ukraine Ukraine
67 [116]
Land Grabbing in Europe? Socio-Cultural
Externalities of Large-Scale Land
Acquisitions
Germany
68 [74] Policy Drivers of Land Mobility in IrishAgriculture Republic of Ireland
69 [117] Farmland rent in the European Union EU
70 [118] Land Tenures as Policy Instruments:Transitions Australia
71 [119] Land Tenure Security and HomeMaintenance Japan
72 [120] The organization and rise of land and leasemarkets EU
73 [31] Land market and e-services Bulgaria
74 [121] Land policies and agricultural land markets Russia
75 [122] Farmland lease decisions in a life-cyclemodel International study
76 [61] Rented land: Barriers to sustainableagriculture US
77 [53]
Does land lease tenure insecurity cause




Rural land ownership in the United
Kingdom: Changing patterns and future
possibilities for land use
UK
79 [66]
Effects of land transfer quality on the
application of organic fertiliser by
large-scale farmers
China
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80 [38] Land Tenure, investment incentives, and thechoice of techniques Nicaragua
81 [61] Rented land: Barriers to sustainableagriculture US
82 [124] Participation in rural land rental markets insub-Saharan Africa Malawi and Zambia
83 [46]
Retirement farming or sustainable
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